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THE PLACE OF THE ANTI-RACKETEERING ACT IN
OUR CONSTITUTIONAL-LEGAL SYSTEM
Louis B. BouDiN
In United States v. Local 807 of Internatiowd Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America et al.,' the United States
Supreme Court dealt with one problem involved in the construction of the
Federal Anti-Racketeering Act:2 its applicability to labor disputes. The
Court discussed neither the constitutionality 3 of the Act nor the amount or
kind of interstate commerce necessary before the Act should apply. Both
questions were raised, but since the answer to neither was necessary for the
disposition of the case, they remained unanswered.
In an earlier case .in which the constitutionality of the Act was attacked,
1315 U. S. 521, 62 Sup. Ct. 642 (1942). The defendant Union contracted with outof-state truck owners to have its drivers operate its trucks while within the limits
of the city of New York and to load and unload them at union rates. The contracts were
the result of disputes as to the propriety of the Union's demands and persistent rejections of the proferred services. The Union and twenty-six of its members were indicted for conspiracy to violate Section 2 (a, b, c) [see note 3 infra] of the AntiRacketeering Act. This section makes it a felony for any person, who, in any act
relating to trade or commerce, by force, violence, intimidation, or threats or force, etc.,
seeks to obtain money from another; except that acts constituting the payment of
wages by a bona fide employer to a bona fide employee are specifically exempted.
The judge charged the jury substantially that if the truck owners had paid the Union
with the intent that such payments were for protection from violence, the Union drivers
could not be "bona fide" employees and, therefore, not protected by the exception
of Section 2 (a). The reversal by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
[118 F. (2d) 684 (1941)] was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, which held
that the intent 'of the owners in making payments was immaterial to the consideration
of an employer-employee status exempt under the Act. A bona fide offer of services,
though rejected, the majority held, would be sufficient to constitute the defendants
employees notwithstanding the owners paid union rates for services which were rejected and never rendered. The majority maintained that the Act was specifically
designed to prevent racketeering by criminal gangs and allows labor unions a permissive field of activity in which to realize their lawful ends. Mr. Chief Justice Stone
dissented. Noted in (1942) 11 FoRD. L. Rxv. 204; (1942) 41 MicH. L. Rav. 338; (1942)
19 N. Y. U. L. Q. Ray. 440; (1942) 16 TEmP. L. Q. 329; (1942) 90 U. PA. L. REv. 972.
248 STAT. 979 (1934) ; 18 U. S. C. A. § 420A (Supp. 1942).
3
The problem of constitutionality arises with reference to Section 2 (a, b, d) [18 U. S.
C. A. § 420A (a, b, d)J which reads as follows:
"Any person who, in connection with or in relation to any act in any way or in
any degree affecting trade or commerce or any article or commodity moving or
about to move in trade or commerce"(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or threat to
use force, violence, or coercion, the payment of money or other valuable considerations, or the puichase or rental of property or protective services, not including,
however, the payment of wages by a bona fide employer to a bona fide employee; or
"(b) Obtains the property of another with his consent, induced by wrongful use
of force or fear or under color of official rights; ...
"(d) Shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a felony and shall be punished
by imprisonment from one to ten years or by a fine of $10,000, or both."
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the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 4 This might indicate that the Supreme
Court is satisfied that the Act is constitutional, but for the repeated warnings
of the Court that conclusions should not be drawn from a denial of certiorari.
It is barely possible that the Court was waiting for a more suitable case.
It is more likely, however, that at least provisionally, the" members of the
Court were of the opinion that the decision as to constitutionality must
await the final determination of the general -meaning of the Act, since it is
upon the meaning that its constitutionality will probably depend.
Counsel for the Teamsters' Union, who had raised the problem of constitutionality, did not contend that the Act was unconstitutional, but merely
that it would be unconstitutional if construed in a certain way.5
The Anti-Racketeering Act deserves the attention of the legal profession
because of its extraordinary features. If construed to mean what it says, it
will be a complete novelty in our law. This is rather unlikely, however,
since in the only case in which the constitutionality of the Act has been discussed, it was upheld, on demurrer, against an attack based on the broad
sweep of its language, by the Court's assumption that this language would
be disregarded in its application. 6

I.

FEDERAL POWER OVER CRIME

It is an elementary proposition that the Federal Government has no general power to punish crime. The suppression of crime is an attribute of
sovereignty; and in our federal system this function is left with the states,
except in situations over which no state has jurisdiction, which ordinarily
means no jurisdiction over the place where the crime was committed. To
this general limitation upon the power of the Federal Government to punish
crime, there must be added certain special limitations, in considering the
Anti-Racketeering Act, because of certain special provisions of the Constitution dealing with the subject of violence.
Article I, Section 8, which enumerates the legislative powers of the Federal
Government, includes the power:
"6. To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities
and current Coin of the United States ;-7
4

Nick v. United States, 122 F. (2d) 660 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S.

687,
62 Sup. Ct. 302 (1941), rehearing denied, 314 U. S. 713, 62 Sup. Ct. 411 (1941).
5
Petitioner's Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 11, Local 807,
etc., et al. v. United States, 314 U. S.596, 62 Sup. Ct. 67 (1941) ; Brief for the Petitioners, pp. 8-26, Local 807, etc., et al. v. United States, 315 U. S. 521, 62 Sup. Ct. 642
(1942).
6Nick v. United States, supra note 4.
7U. S. CoNsT., Art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
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"10. To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations ;,.8
and,
"17. To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over
such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of
Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all
Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which
the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dockYards, and other needful Buildings." 9
Article III, Section 3, provides that
"2. The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of
Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood,
or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted."'10
Only these four provisions expressly grant power over crimes to the Federal Government. Two deal with places over which the Federal Government
is given exclusive jurisdiction; and the other two, with offenses directed
against the Government itself or its functions-the latter having been considerably extended by judicial construction of other powers. The power of
the Federal Government to suppress crime has never been held to be coextensive with its power to legislate generally. Stealing from the mails and using
the mails to defraud, for example, are now federal offenses because the Post
Office is now a governmental function. This power stems from the provision
of Article I, Section 8, which empowers Congress "To establish Post Offices
and post Roads."'" The power of Congress to punish crime, however, is not
as extensive as its power to "establish" under this provision. It could not,
for example, punish all crimes committed on Post Roads. 12
Article IV, Section 4, suggests limitations upon the power of dealing with
I
the crime of violence:
"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive
(when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."' 3
8U. S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl.10.
OU. S. CONsT., Art. I, § 8, cl.17.
IOU. S. CONsT., Art. III, § 3, cl.
2.
"IU.
S. CoxsT., Art. I, § 8, cl.
7.
2

1 This power, as stated by Mr. Justice McLean in United States v. Railroad Bridge
Co., 6 McLean 517 (C. C. N. D. IIl. 1855) at p. 525: "has generally been considered as
exhausted in the designation of roads on which the mails are to be transported." But cf.
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and B. Bridge Co., 18 How. 421 (U. S.1856).
13 U. S. CONST., Art. IV, § 4.
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Section 8 of Article I, which contains the enumeration of the powers of
Congress, contains a grant of power with respect to one phase of domestic
violence, insurrection. That grant empowers Congress
"15. To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute
the Laws of
14
the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions.'
The grant of power, significantly, is limited to the suppression of insurrections; the limitation, on the other hand, refers to "domestic violence,"
which was apparently intended to mean violence of a less serious nature than
insurrection. One thing is clear. Where the violence does not amount to
insurrection, the Constitution is more concerned with the limitations placed
upon the power of the Federal Government to interfere with the states, than
upon the protection to be given to them or their inhabitants. Not only does
the right of the Federal Government to interfere depend upon a request for
protection, but the state itself can only apply for it through certain designated functionaries, primarily the Legislature. The right of the Executive
to ask for the interference of the Federal Government is limited to the case
where the Legislature is not in session and catngot be convened. Clearly,
the Founding Fathers were extremely anxious to safeguard the states against
the attempted exercise of federal power by reason of the existence of violence or under the guise of an attempted suppression thereof.15
That these fears were justified has been demonstrated by the history of
our labor relations. A noteworthy example is the vehement protest of
Governor Altgeld against the action of President Cleveland in sending United
States troops to Chicago for the purpose of suppressing the Pullman strike.'0
Nor was this an isolated instance.
II. FEDERAL CRIME LEGISLATION, 1789-1934
Until the enactment of the Anti-Racketeering Act, Congress had very
carefully limited its legislation with respect to violence to matters within its
§ 8, cl.
15.
15Indeed, one of the Framers took this matter so seriously that he considered even
the limited grant of power to the federal government to interfere in the internal affairs
of the state by way of suppressing violence upon the request of the Executive alone, a
ground for hi refusal to approve the Constitution. On September 10, 1787, one week
before the adjournment of the Constitutional Convention, Edmund Randolph stated
that he might be compelled to withhold his assent to the adoption of the Constitution.
As one of the reasons therefore he gave the above-mentioned grant of power. The clause
as it then stood, however, ,did not contain the limiting words, "vhen the Legislature
cannot be convened." It is to be presumed that the limiting words were inserted in
order to meet his objection, which may have been shared by others. 2 FARRAND, THE
14U. S. CoNsT., Art. I,

RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1911)
16
BERMAN,

pp. 560-561, 563-564.

LABOR DISPUTES AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

STATES

20-34; CLEVELAND, THE GOVERNMENT IN THE CHICAGO STRIKE OF 1894 (1913)

(1924)

pp.

pp. 39-45.
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exclusive jurisdiction. 1 7 Prior to the enactment in 1913 of the act directed
against larceny on trains moving in interstate commerce, Congress had so
limited its legislation with respect to crime generally.
The first Federal Crimes Act'8 dealt with treason, misprision of treason,
murder, manslaughter, and similar felonies in forts and arsenals within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, piracy and other felonies on the
high seas, and related offenses. In addition, it provided for punishment of
offenses against functions of the United States Government, such as counterfeiting the securities and coin of the United States, stealing or falsifying its
records, perjury in its courts, bribery of its judges, obstruction of process
in its courts, suing ambassadors and similar offenses against the Law of
Nations.' 9
The Crimes Act of 182520 was drawn along the same lines, although it
was more comprehensive than the Crimes Act of 1790. It covered the additional crime of arson in any fort, arsenal, or other place within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. With respect to the class of crimes
upon the "high seas," the 1825 Act not only made criminal certain acts not
covered by the Crimes Act of 1790, but also gave a more comprehensive
enumeration of places considered part of the high seas. Having extended
the meaning of "high seas," Congress was careful to add that the place
where the crime was committed must be "out of the jurisdictian of any
particular State." The enactment also added two other types of offenses belonging to the same category: (1) Offenses committed in foreign waters on
board ships flying the American flag by a crew member or passenger on a
similar person; and (2) The plundering of vessels upon the high seas or
castaways, and the causing of a castaway for the purpose of collecting the
insurance. In the category of offenses against governmental functions, the
statute added extortion by a United States officer under color of office and
larceny or embezzlement from the United States Bank by an officer or employee thereof.
The addition of the crime of plunder of castaways gave rise to the case
of United States v. Coombs,21 in which it was held, probably for the first
1737

STAT.
181 STAT.

670 (1913), now 18 U. S. C.A. §§ 409-411.

112 (1790), now 18 U. S. C. A. §§ 1, 3, 451, 452, 453, 481; CRIM. CODE
§§ 1 3, 272, 27j, 274, 290.
.'91 STAT. 115 (1790), now 18 U. S. C. A. §§ 283, 262, 272, 233, 231, 237, 245; CGuM.
CODE §§ 169, 148, 28, 127, 125, 131, 140.
204 STAT. 115 (1825), now 18 U. S. C. A. §§ 464, 465, 468, 452, 454, 457, 28 U. S.
C. A. § 102, 18 U. S. C. A. §§ 489, 490, 467, 488, 486, 465 note, 171, 231, 232, 564,
28 U. S. C. A. § 102, 18 U. S. C. A. §§ 695, 71, 78, 79, 129, 455, 487, 547; CRIM. CODE
§§ 285, 286, 289, 273, 275, 278, -, 298, 299, 288, 297, 295, 286, 85, 125, 126,
-, 27, 33, 34, 72, 276, 296, -.
2112 Pet. 72 (U. S.1838).

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 28

time, that the admiralty jurisdiction of the United- States courts was an
independent grant of legislative power to Congress. The inclusion of crimes
committed on board United .States ships lying in foreign ports led to the
adoption of a proviso with respect to double jeopardy.
There has been no general revision of the criminal legislation of the United
States since the Crimes Act of 1825, although there have been codifications
,of existing laws, and, of course, many separate statutes adding greatly to
the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction. As already stated, however, there
had been no departure in principle from the two early Crimes Acts until
the enactment of the Larceny Act of 1913.22 There has been, however, a
departure of great practical import when Congress augmented the scope
,of offenses against governmental functions by its extension to crimes committed with the aid of governmental agencies. Even a greater 'practical departure was affected when Congress extended its power to regulate interstate commerce so as to include the punishment of the use of instrumentalities
,of interstate comnerce for immoral or illegal purposes. Making it an offense
to use the mails as an instrumentality of fraud is a principal instance of the
former,23 while the Mann Act 24 is a conspicuous example of the latter.
The reason for the enactment of the Larceny Act, as revealed by the debates in Congress, 25 was the alleged difficulty of proving the locus of a
crime committed on a carrier moving in interstate commerce, and of establishing thereby the jurisdiction of the state court in which the prosecution was
attempted. Whether this departure from principle in 1913, as expanded in
1914, was warranted is very questionable.
The Larceny Act involved three departures from the previous course of
federal legislation with respect to crime: (1) It made the commission of an
ordinary crime, larceny, a federal offense because of its having been coinmitted in, interstate commerce; (2) It made the ordinary crime of receiving
stolen goods a federal offense because the goods had been stolen while in
interstate commerce; and, (3) It made it a federal offense to use an instrumentality of interstate commerce not in the commission of the crime, but
after the commission of the crime in the removal or disposition of the proceeds of the crime. 26. The last was not, strictly speaking,, a departure from
2237 STAT. 670 (1913), now 18 U. S. C. A. § 409.
2317

323 (1872), now 18 U. S. C. A. § 338; CRan. CODE § 215.
825 (1910), 18 U. S. C. A. §§ 397-404. Congress early prevented the use
of governmental functions for immoral purposes by making it a criminal offense to
so use such functions. 17 STAT. 598 (1873), now 18 U. S. C. A. § 334; CRIM. CODE
§ 211, amended (dealing with the mails). The imposition of a similar restriction upon
the use of interstate commerce for such purposes was a later innovation. 29 STAT. 512
(1897), now 18 U. S. C. A. § 396; CPIM. CODE § 245, amended.
2578 CONG. Rac. pp. 448-452 (1934).
26
The material provisions of the Larceny Act are as follows:
STAT.
2436 STAT.
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the previously governing principles of federal criminal legislation, but merely
an extension of the principle that the use of an instrumentality of interstate
commerce in connection with the commission of a crime may be made a federal offense. On the other hand, making an ordinary crime, which was
previously cognizable only in a state court, a federal offense merely because
the crime was committed in interstate commerce or in connection with an
article moving in interstate commerce was a complete departure from the
earlier principles of federal criminal legislation, and affected the basic distribution of powers between state and nation.
The crimes of larceny and of receiving stolen goods are, and always have
been, crimes under the laws of the states where committed. Whatever the
constitutional problem, there can be no question of the fact that this was a
practical invasion of a sphere of competence long enjoyed exclusively by
the states. On the other hand, there was no such invasion in making the use
of interstate commerce a federal offense. No state could, under our constitutional system, make the transportation of a stolen article from one state
to another a crime. The state within which the larceny had been committed
could only punish that act, but not the act of removing the stolen property
from the state, while the state into which the article was transported could
punish neither the larceny itself, which'had taken place in another state,
nor the importation of the stolen article into its jurisdiction.
The Larceny Act of 1913 was followed by what has come to be known
as the Embezzlement Act of 1914,27 which made the embezzlement by an
"That whoever shall unlawfully break the seal of any railroad car containing interstate or foreign shipments or freight or express, or shall enter any such car with
intent, in either case, to commit larceny therein; or whoever shall steal or unlawfully take, carry away, or conceal, or by fraud or deception obtain from any railroad
car . . . with intent to convert to his own use any goods or chattels moving as, or
which are a part of, or which constitute, an interstate or foreign shipment of freight
or express, or shall buy or receive or have in his possession any such goods or
chattels, knowing the same to have been stolen; . . . shall in each case be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. . . " 37 STAT. 670
(1913), now 18 U. S. C. A. § 409.
"That nothing in this Act contained shall be held to take away or impair the
jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof; and a judgment of conviction or acquittal on the merits under the laws of any State shall be a
bar to any prosecution hereunder for the same act or acts." 37 STAT. 670 (1913),
now 18 U. S. C. A. § 410.

733-734 (1914) (Section 9 of the Clayton Act), now 18 U. S. C. A. § 412.
"Every president, director, officer, or manager, of any firm, association or corporation
engaged in commerce as a common carrier, who embezzles, steals, abstracts, or willfully
misapplies, or willfully permits to be misapplied, any of the moneys, funds, credits,
securities, property or assets of such firm, association or corporation, arising or accruing
from, or used in, such commerce, in whole or in part, or willfully or knowingly converts the same to his own use or to the use of another, shall be fined not less than $5,000
or confined in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than ten years, or both,
in the discretion of the court. . ..
"That nothing in this section shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of
2738 STAT.
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officer of a common carrier in interstate commerce a federal offense. This
offense was already prohibited by state law, and was, therefore, punishable
in state courts. The 1914 Act was thus a further extension of the 1913 departure from the principles which had governed earlier congressional action
with respect to criminal legislation.
III.

"CONcURRENT"

JURISDICTION

The care with which Congress had limited its criminal legislation, until
1913, to those spheres which the Constitution had placed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government was probably the result of a
recognition of the very serious consequences which must inevitably follow any
other course. While there is some loose language about "concurrent" jurisdiction in certain domains of our law, particularly in the regulation of commerce, there is in fact no such thing. No two governments can regulate the
same thing, and any attempt to do so would create such confusion as to
make efficient regulation impossible. As far back' as 1849, Mr. Justice
McLean expressed this idea in emphatic language, which is as valid today
as it was then:
"A concurrent power in two distinct sovereignties to regulate the
same thing is as inconsistent in principle as it is impractical in action.
28
It involves a moral and physical impossibilit ."

What was said about' regulation applies even more emphatically to the
suppression of crime. No two governments can have the power to punish
the same crime without creating such confusion as would make proper enforcement impossible.' In this country, in addition, there are certain constitutional guarantees with respect to the freedom of the individual which
exclude the possibility of our two governments having concurrent jurisdiction to punish the same crime. With Aome exceptions, our two governments,
in their legislative branches, have carefully avoided encroaching upon the
other's preserves. The Federal Government, because of its limited powers,
attempted to stay within the exclusive domain assigned to it by the Constitution, leaving the general problem of the suppression of crime to the states.
When, occasionally, the 'two governments attempted to punish the same
offense, the courts, and ultimately the United States Supreme Court, stepped
in to clear away the confusion and relegate each government to its own
sphere. The individual judges, or the different courts, did not always agree
the courts of the several States under the laws thereof; and a judgment of conviction
or acquittal on the merits under the laws of any State shall be a bar to any prosecution
hereunder
for the same act or acts."
2
8Passenger Cases, 7 How, 283, 399 (U. S.1849).
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on which government was competent in a particular case to punish the
offense involved, but they all agreed that only one governnent could do so.
This is well illustrated by the case of Fox v. Ohio,29 decided in 1847. The

defendant had been convicted in the Ohio courts of the offense of passing
counterfeits of the coin of the United States. On a: writ of error, the defendant claimed that the state court had no jurisdiction over the offense for
which she had been'convicted because of the constitutional provision which
gave Congress the power to punish the counterfeiting of United States coin.
The state based its jurisdiction on the fact that the crime of passing counterfeit coin was utterly different from that of counterfeiting the coin of the
realm. It was argued that one was directed against the government in the
discharge of a governmental function, while the other was a fraud upon the
citizen perpetrated through the medium of a worthless coin. The contention
was upheld by the Supreme Court, and the conviction sustained over the
vigorous objection of Mr. Justice McLean. Mr. Justice Daniel, for the
majority, very carefully distinguished between the two offenses, and emphasized that the protection of the citizens against ordinary cheating was particularly within the province of the states, rather than of the Federal Government. 30
The case is particularly interesting because there was no federal statute
punishing the passing of counterfeit coin. The argument on behalf of the
defendant was, therefore, based on the mere existence, under the Constitution, of a power in Congress to make such a law. Mr. Justice McLean
adopted this argument in his dissenting opinion, and the majority of the
Court did not dispute the principle.
The majority of the Court did not say that the mere existence of the
power in Congress to enact a law punishing the passing of counterfeit coin
would not deprive the states of their power to punish that offense so long
as that power remained unexercised. On the contrary, the Court assumed
that the mere existence of such power would prevent the state from exercising it even in the absence of congressional legislation. It therefore based its
decision upon a narrow construction of the constitutional provision in question, which limited the power -of Congress to punishing counterfeiting only,
but not the passing of counterfeit coin.31
This construction of the federal power was undoubtedly too narrow, as
How. 410 (U. S. 1847).
"The punishment of a cheat or a misdemeanor practised within the State and against
those whom she is bound to protect, is peculiarly and appropriately within her functions
and duties, and it is difficult to imagine an interference with those duties and functions
which
would be regular or justifiable." Id. at 434. (Italics added.)
31
1d. at 433. (Italics added.)
295
30
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was pointed out in Mr. Justice McLean's able dissenting opinion. The Court
was divided with respect to where the power resided and not with respect
to the principle that only one government can exercise any given power.
The basicprinciple upon which the entire Court agreed was stated by Mr.
Justice McLean:
"Two governments acting independently
of each other cannot exercise
32
the same power for the same object."
IV.

UNFORTUNATE

EXPERIENCES UNDER

CONCURRENT

JURISDICTION

The unfortunate results flowing from a theory which would permit our
two governments to legislate on the same subject, or punish the same offense,
are shown by two disastrous periods of our history: (1) The controversy
over the rendition of fugitive slaves during the decade preceding the Civil
War; and, (2) The decade during which the Prohibition Amendment was
in force.
A.

The Controversy over the Rendition of Fugitive Slaves
Article IV, Section 2, of the United States Constitution provides that:
"No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another,'shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be
delivered up '33
on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour
may be due."
Acting under this provision, Congress, in 1793, enacted a law whereby
the owner of a fugitive slave, his agent or attorney, was authorized to seize
the slave and take him before a United States judge or state magistrate, make
proof that the seized person was a fugitive slave, and thereupon it became
"the duty of such judge or magistrate to give a certificate thereof to such
claimant, his agent or attorney, which shall be sufficient warrant for removing the said fugitive from labour, to the state or territory from which
'3 4
he or she fled."
As long as the question of slavery was not seriously agitated, the provisions
of this statute seem to have been sufficient to protect the rights of owners of
fugitive slaves; and the states seem to have been generally indifferent to
the subject. When the agitation over slavery assumed serious proportions,
however, some of the states took a hand in the matter by passing laws of their
own, designed not only to regulate the rendition of fugitive slaves, but
also, and perhaps primarily, to prevent the improper seizure and carrying
32

33

at 436. (Italics added.)
U. S. CoxsT., Art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
1d.

341 STAT.

302, 304-305 (1793).
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off of persons of color into slave states under the pretext that they were
fugitive slaves. Among the states which took 'a hand in the matter was
Pennsylvania, which passed "An Act to give effect to the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States relative to fugitive slaves from labor, for
the protection of free people of color, and to prevent kidnapping." 35 This
Act provided an elaborate method for rendition of fugitive slaves, and for
the punishment of those who carried off persons of color on the claim that
they were fugitive slaves without complying with the provisions of the Act.
This gave rise to the famous case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania,6 in which this
act was declared unconstitutional, on the ground that the Constitution placed
the subject of slave-rendition within the power of the Federal Government,
and, therefore, outside the sphere of state competency.
Divergent as were the views of the members of the Court on some of the
problems involved, there was no difference of opinion on the basic principle
that no two governments may regulate the same subject or punish the same
offense. The Court also was unanimous in the opinion that, generally, the
grant of power to Congress to regulate a given subject deprives the states
of the power to legislate on the same subject. Some members of the Court,
however, seemed to think that the subject of slave-rendition was sui generis,
and concurrent action was therefore permissible with respect thereto pro37
vided that the state action helped the owner recapture his slaves.
Mr. Justice Story, speaking on behalf of the Court, said of the Federal
Act of 1793:
"In a general sense, this act may be tiuly said to cover the whole
ground of the Constitution . . . not because it exhausts the remedies
which may be applied by Congress to enforce the rights, if the provisions
of the act shall in practice be found not to attain the object of the Constitution; but because it points out fully all the modes of attaining those
objects, which Congress, in their discretion have as yet deemed expedient
or proper to meet the exigencies of the Constitution. If this be so, then
it would seem, upon just principles of construction, that the legislation
of Congress, if constitutional, must supersede all State legislation, upon
the same subject; and by necessary implication prohibit it. For, if Congress have a constitutional power to regulate a particular subject, and
they do actually regulate it in a given manner, and in a certain form, it
cannot be that the State Legislatures have a right to interfere, and, as
it were, by way of complement to the legislation of Congress, to prescribe
additional regulations, and what they may deem auxiliary provisions
for the same purpose. In such a case, the legislation of Congress, in what
35
Act of the General Assembly, March 25, 1826.
3616 Pet. 539 (U. S. 1842).
37
See concurring opinions of Mr. Chief Justice Taney (Id. at 627), Mr. Justice
Thompson (Id. at 635), and Mr. Justice Daniel (Id. at 652).
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it does prescribe, manifestly indicates that it does not intend that there
shall be any farther legislation to act upon the subject matter. Its silence
as to what it does not do is as3 expressive of what its intention is as the
direct provisions made by it." 8

Prigg v. Pennsylvania was decided in 1842. Ten years later, when the
subject of slavery became more acute, and the Southern point of view more
influential with the Supreme Court, Moore v. Illinois"9 was decided, in which
the sui generis theory of slave-rendition was accepted. In the face of the
opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the Court now declared that it had not
decided that state legislation in aid of a slave owner which does not "delay,
impede or frustrate" the master in the exercise of his right under the Constitution was unconstitutional. 40 In this case, one who had apparently helped
a negro along the "underground railway" was indicted under an Illinois
statute which provided for the punishment of anyone who shall "harbor or
secrete any Negro, mulatto or person of color, the same being a slave or
servant owing service or labor to any other person . . . or shall in any way

hinder or prevent the lawful owner or owners of such slaves or servants
from retaking them." 41 By this time, the Court apparently was anxious
that the slave owner should have the benefit of koth federal and state legislation in his attempt to recapture his fugitive slaves, and the Illinois statute
favoring the slave owner was upheld although the Pennsylvania statute
favoring the slave had been invalidated in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.
The brief opinion on behalf of the majority of the Court by Mr. Justice
Grier avoids discussion of any fundamental constitutional problems, even
to the extent of any elaboratioh of Chief Justice Taney's sui generis theory.
Instead it harks back to the doctrine of Fox v. Ohio,42 that the offense
punished by the state was different from the offense punishable under the
federal law. The offense of which the defendaiit in this case was convicted
in the Illinois court was not interference with the rendition of the slave, but
"harboring" a slave, an offense against the laws of Illinois, irrespective of
the problem of slave-rendition. It is clear, however, that Chief Justice Taney
had not given up his opinion of the exceptional position of slave-rendition
under the Constitution. But for the acceptance of that theory the decision
in this case would probably not have been rendered. It is possible, however,
that the, Court resorted to the extraordinary statement that the Illinois
statute was not an "auxiliary" statute to the federal statute, but an inde38

1d. at pp. 617-618. (Italics added.)
How. 13 (U. S. 1852).
!Old. at 19.
41
Then ILL. Cim CoDE § 149.
42
Supra note 30.
3914
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pendent statute punishing . "harboring" disconnected from slave-rendition,
in order to avoid the adoption of a theory which would permit the two
governments to punish the same crime under any circumstances and to evade
the constitutional problem of double jeopardy.
B.

The Prohibition Interlude

The decisions of the Supreme Court on the slave-rendition question were
a prelude to the Civil War, and led to a revolt of some of the state courts
against the authority of the Supreme Court. A national crisis, however, soon
eliminated that question from the domain of constitutional law. More than
half a century later, a similar problem arose during the Prohibition interlude.
The Prohibition Amendment 43 introduced, with respect to the liquor traffic,
the theory propounded by Chief justice Taney with respect to the problem
of slave-rendition. There could be no doubt as to the meaning of the
Eighteenth Amendment. That Amendment put the problem of the traffic in
intoxicating liquors on its own plane; it did not assign the regulation of
that traffic either to the Federal Government or to the state governments.
Instead, it regulated the subject itself, by absolutely prohibiting traffic in
intoxicating liquor. Having prohibited that traffic, it expressly conferred upon
Congress and the several states "concurrent power to enforce" the prohibition. 4" It formally introduced into our Federal system the revolutionary
notion of "concurrent power." Its limitation to the enforcement of one constitutional enactment, however, made it a less revolutionary concept of federal relations. The sequel proved the correctness of Mr. justice McLean's
contention that "there ain't no such animal" as "concurrent power," no
matter how limited the sphere in which it is designed to operate. Since
two governments operating on the same subject, or in the same field, must
necessarily clash with each other, the enactment of the Eighteenth Amend4
ment led thoughtful people to speculate as to the consequences. 5
43U. S. CONST., AMEND. XVIII.
44U.
S. CoNsT., AmEND. XVIII, § 2.
45

Professor Noel T. Dowling wrote:
"Though it has been recognized that this amendment marked a new departure in the
relationship of the state and federal governments in the enforcement of law, and though
the amendment has been before the United States Supreme Court, many of the inferior
federal courts, and the courts of almost half the states, there has come from the firstnamed court no pronouncement of the positive meaning of concurrent power, nor have
the other courts, federal and state, disclosed a clear and definite agreement in that
regard. In fact a justice of the United States Supreme Court has declared that 'it is
impossible now to say with fair certainty what construction should be given to the
eighteenth amendment', and that 'because of the bewilderment which it creates, a multitude of questions will inevitably arise and demand solution' in that court." (Italics
added.)
Dowling, Concurrent Power under the Eighteenth Amendment (1922) 6 MINN. L.
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Fortunately, the United States Constitution contains a solution of the
problem of concurrent power, or at least a mitigation of the difficulties
arising therefrom, by providing that real concurrent power is impossible in
our Federalsystem. This impossibility is decreed by the Supremacy Clause. 46
It is a settled principle of constitutional law that every power granted by
the Constitution is subject to all the limitations contained therein. The
power conferred upon the states with respect to the enforcement of the Prohibition Amendment was subject to the Supremacy Clause. The proper
meaning of the "concurrent power" conferred upon the state by the Eighteenth Amendment, therefore, was merely that the states had power to enforce the constitutional prohibition of the liquor traffic in subordination to
Congress, that is, only as long as Congress did not legislate on the subject.
The only alternative to such a reading of the Eighteenth Amendment was
the adoption of Taney's sui generis theory with respect to slave-rendition,
which was the theory ultimately adopted by the courts. 47 That theory, while
minimizing the danger, did not guarantee the avoidance of clashes between
federal and state courts, such as appeared during the 1850's as a result of
the Supreme Court's attitude on slavery and slave-rendition. Although under
this theory the power of the states to enforce the Prohibition Amendment
could only be exercised "in aid" of Prohibition, the situation would have
become serious, if the states had more zeal than they had in the performance
of their constitutional "duties" under the Amendment. Such clashes were,
in fact, avoided both by the enactment of the Volstead Act,48 which prescribed more stringent regulations and heavier penalties than any state law,
and by the states, in effect, abandoning their own attempts at enforcement.
The repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment 49 terminated this interlude before its dangerous possibilities had a chance to develop. Federal criminal
jurisdiction for a brief spell then reverted to what may be called the norml
state of our constitutional law.50
REv. 447, 447. The inner quotation is from the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
McReynolds in the National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350, 392, 40 Sup. Ct. 486

(1920).
4

6U. S. CONST., Art. VI, cl. 2.
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
47State v. Hartley, 115 S. C. 524, 106 S. E. 766 (1921) ; Vigliotti v. Pennsylvania,
258 U. S.403, 42 Sup. Ct. 330 (1922) ; McCormick and Co. v. Brown, 286 U. S. 131,
52 Sup. Ct. 522 (1932).
4841 STAT. 305 (1919).
49U. S. CowsT., AMEND. XXI, effective December 5,1933.
50
The normal state was described by Professor Willoughby:
"The legislative powers possessed by the Federal Government may be divided into
two classes: the one embracing those powers the exercise of which is exclusively vested
in the General Government; the other those which, in default of Federal, exercise, may
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V.

THE CITIZEN AND His Two GOVERNMENTS

The problem of concurrent jurisdiction envisaged from the point of view
of government involves the possibility of clashes between federal and state
government and of confusion resulting from their attempts to regulate the
same subject or to operate in the same field. Another aspect of the problem
which must be considered is the citizen and his rights. The Fifth Amendment provides, among other things: ".

.

. nor shall any person be subject

for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." 51 All state
constitutions contain similar provisions. 52 It is a principle of general law,
however, that double jeopardy does not apply to convictions or acquittals in
foreign courts ;53 and our two sets of courts are supposed to be "foreign"
to each other. As a matter of fact, the theory is erroneous, whether applied
to true foreign courts, or to the two sets of courts sharing judicial power in
the United States. It would be true of American courts only if there actually were concurrent jurisdiction between them. This was one of the reasons
urged by Mr. Justice McLean in opposition to the theory of concurrent
power between our two governments with respect to slave-rendition. 54 The
bearing of that aspect upon the constitutionality of the Anti-Racketeering
Act requires a clear understanding of the legal concepts which underlie the
problem of double jeopardy, and its applicability generally where courts of
different jurisdictions are involved.
The principle of double jeopardy is a branch of the law of res judicata;
vz'z., a matter once litigated between the same parties may not be litigated
again. In a criminal case, the litigation is between a government and the
individual charged with the commission of the offense. Therefore, when a
person has been charged by any government with the commission of an
offense against its laws, and the litigation has resulted in a judgment upon
the merits, either in his favor or against him, that matter is closed forever.
When he is indicted for the same offense by another government, that litigation is not between the same parties, and there has, therefore, been no
previous adjudication within the principles of the law of res judicata. At first
be employed by the States * * *
"In view of the fact that, as to these so-called concurrent powers, State law must
always yield to Federal law, whzen one exists, it is perhaps unfortunate that the term
'concurrent' should have come into existence, since the word indicates an equality of
jurisdiction which does not exist."
151 WILLOUGHBY ON THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1929) 112, § 69. (Italics added.)
U. S. CoNsT., AMEND. V.
52
See, for example, N. Y. CONsT.,
53

Art. I, § 6.
Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U. S.254, 42 Sup. Ct. 309 (1922) ; United States v. Lanza,
260 U. S.377, 43 Sup. Ct. 141 (1922).
54
- See supra p. 271.
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glance, that would seem to expose a person to prosecution by as many governments as choose to prosecute him for the same offense. Fortunately,
care has been taken, here as elsewhere, that "the trees should not grow into
the skies." Another principle of the general law of res judicata comes into
play. In order that the previous adjudication may bar further litigation,
whether civil or criminal, the court which rendered the first judgment must
have had jurisdiction. And no two governments can have jurisdiction over
-the same offense.
When, therefore, a person is prosecuted for an offense which he claims
has been disposed of by a previous judgment-that is to say, he claims double
jeopardy-the question, assuming the offense to be the same, resolves itself
into an investigation of the problem of the jurisdiction of the first court. If
that court did not have jurisdiction, then the plea must fail, as would any
other plea of res judicata under the same circumstances. If the first court
had jurisdiction, then the present court has no jurisdiction, the plea will be
sustained, and the defendant acquitted. While technically, there is no such
thing as a plea of double jeopardy because of an adjudication in a foreign
court, a conviction or an acquittal in a foreign court which had jurisdiction
is nevertheless a perfect defense. 55
The question of jurisdiction is usually a question of place. The situation
is no different with respect to jurisdiction as between the federal and state
governments; the jurisdiction of the Federal Government in criminal cases
is, generally speaking, a question of the place of the comdssion of the
offense.56 Ordinarily, therefore, the problem of double jeopardy raises few
difficulties on the score of the jurisdiction of the court of first decision, since
territorial sovereignty is seldom in dispute. Occasionally, however, such
55

The result is stated by Wheaton:
"A criminal sentence pronounced under the municipal law of one State can have no
direct legal effect inanother.... But a valid sentence, whether of conviction or acquittal, pronounced in one State, may have certain indirect and collateral in other States.
If pronounced under the municipal law in the State where the supposed crime was committed, or to which the supposed offender owed allegiance, the sentence, either of conviction or acquittal, would, of course, be an effectual bar (exceptio rei judicatae) to a
prosecution in any other State."
WHEATON, INTERNATIOxAL LAW (8th ed. 1866) pp. 191-192. The reference by
Wheaton to the state "to which the supposed offender owed allegiance" referred to
cases
of "extra-territoriality."
56 "t is true that the criminal jurisdiction of the United States is in general based
on the territorial principle, and criminal statutes of the United States are not by implication given an extra-territorial effect [citing cases]. But that principle has never been
thought to be applicable to a merchant vessel, which for purposes of the jurisdiction of
the courts of the sovereignty whose flag it flies to punish crimes committed upon it, is
deemed to be a part of the territory of that sovereignty and not to lose that character
when. in navigable waters within the territorial limits of anwther sovereignty [citing

cases]. (Italics added.)

United States v. Flores, 289 U. S. 137, 155-156, 53 Sup. Ct. 580, 584-585 (1933).
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difficulties do arise. There is, to begin with, that vast area known as the
"high seas" over which no government has any exclusive sovereignty.
Offenses upon the "high seas," using that term in its strict sense, are of
two kinds: crimes committed by one ship upon another, and crimes committed on board ship. The first complex of crimes is known under the
generic term of "piracy." By the Law of Nations, which is recognized by
the United States Constitution,57 the plea of double jeopardy in a piracy
case is good even though the court of first decision was that of a foreign
country. 58 A ship is recognized by the same Law of Nations as an extension
of the territory of the sovereign under whose flag it sails.
A ship, of course, is not always on the high seas. Occasionally it lies
within the territorial waters of another sovereign. When a serious crime
is committed while the ship is in such territorial waters, there might arise
a problem of disputed jurisdiction, for the two sovereignties, the territorial
sovereignty of the waters and the sovereignty of the flag, might each claim
jurisdiction. Since there is no common arbiter, each sovereign may decide
the question in its own favor. In such cases, the Supreme Court has said,
the problem is disposed of on the principle of "comity" between the nations
involved, depending upon the nature of the crime. 59
The question of "comity" ordinarily arises, and is disposed of, before
trial. When the matter is disposed of amicably; the nation that yields its
jurisdiction to another nation will have, of necessity by that act, recognized
the jurisdiction of the courts of that nation, and will not thereafter prosecute
the offender in its own courts. The sovereign who has possession of the
criminal may, of course, not admit that the case comes within the category
of offenses which by the comity of nations should yield to the other sovereign.
What then? Is the offender to be exposed to double jeopardy? Such a thing
is inconceivable, for the protection against double jeopardy is not only a
part of the Law of Nations, but is recognized by every civilized community..
A country that did not recognize it could scarcely be considered civilized.
It is this that made Mr. Justice McLean protest so vehemently against
the attempt to establish "concurrent jurisdiction" between the federal and
state governments. Since the two governments of our federal system are
not actually foreign to each other, the Law of Nations does not apply to
them, and its recognition of the defense of double jeopardy would, therefore,
57U. S. CONST., Art. I,

§ 8, cl. 10:
"[The Congress shall have Power] To define and punish . . . Offences against the
Law
of Nations."
5
8See the Piracy cases: United States v. Furlong, 5 Wheat. 84 (U. S. 1820).
59
See United States v. Flores, 289 U. S. 137, 53 Sup. Ct. 580 (1933).
J
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not be applicable to cases of slave-rendition. The Act of 179360 did not
foresee the situation and made no provision for it, rendering the offender
defenseless once concurrent jurisdiction was admitted. This was particularly
so in a case where the court of "first decision" was a state court.6 ' Mr. Justice McLean's argument on this point in Moore v. Illinois62 has, therefore,
a peculiar -timeliness and is deserving of particular attention.
His point was a double one: (1) The fact that there could be no protection against double jeopardy was itself proof that there could be no concurrent power; and, (2) The fact that Congress did not provide such protection was proof that it did not think it was dealing with a subject over
which it did not have exclusive jurisdiction. The latter position was amply
justified by the action of Congress in the only case where it had legislated
on a subject of concurrent jurisdiction; namely, the subject of crimes
committed on board a ship lying in a foreign port. The Crimes Act of 179003
made no provision for the punishment of crimes committed on board an
American ship while lying in a foreign port. This offense was first provided for by the Crimes Act of 1825. 64 Section 5 of that Act provided that
a conviction or acquittal in the courts of the sovereign of the port in which
the ship was at the time of the commission of the crime should entitle the
offender to the plea of double jeopardy in any subsequent prosecution in
302 (1793).
6 United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 42 Sup. Ct. 141 (1922) ; Breed v. Powers,
263 U. S.4, 44 Sup. Ct. 8 (1923) ; Wyman v. United States, 263 U. S.14, 44 Sup. Ct.
601 STAT.
1

10 (1923).

How. 13, 19 (U. S.1852).
"It is contrary to the nature and genius of our government, to punish an individual
twice for the same offense. Where the jurisdiction is clearly vested in the federal
government, and an adequate punishment has been provided by it for an offense, no
state, it appears to me, can punish for the same act. The assertion of such a power
involves the rights of a state to punish all offenses punishable under the Acts of Congress. This would practically disregard, if it did not destroy, this important branch of
criminal justice, clearly vested in the federal government. The exercise of such a
power by the States would, in effect be a violation of the Constitution of the United
States, and the Constitution of the respective states. They all provide against a second
punishment for the same act. It is no satisfactory answer to this, to say that the States
and federal government constitute different sovereignties, and consequently, may each
punish offenders under its own laws.
"It is true, the criminal laws of the federal and state governments emanate from different sovereignties, but they operate upon the same people, and should have the same
ends in view. In this respect, the federal government, though sovereign within the
limitations of its powers, may, in some sense, be considered as the agent of the States,
to provide for the general welfare, by punishing offenses under its own laws within
its own jurisdiction. It is believed that no government, regulated by laws, punishes twice
criminally the same act. And I deeply regret that our government should be an exception to a great principle of action, sanctioned by humanity and justice." Id. at pp. 21-22.
(-Italics
added.)
6
6214

3Supra note 18.
Supra note 20.

64
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the courts of the United States. In each of the instances in which Congress
has since dealt with a subject within concurrent jurisdiction of the federal
and state governments it has provided that a conviction or acquittal in a
state court should protect the offender against further prosecution in the
federal courts.65
VI.

SUPERIORITY OF FEDERAL POWER OVER STATE POLICE POWER

The power of Congress to regulate the matters-placed by the Constitution
within its sphere of competency is superior to the'police power of the states.
This is true whether the term, "police power," is used in the broad sense
given to it by Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases6 as "the power to
govern men and things," or in its narrower sense of providing for the
"health, safety, and morals" of the community. 67 It applies not only to
matters expressly within the exclusive power of the Federal Government,
but also to those cases in which the Federal Government and the states are
said to have "concurrent jurisdiction." As Professor Willoughby has said:
"Though often spoken of as a matter of concurrent jurisdiction, this
authority of the States to legislate with reference to matters primarily of
local concern, but which incidentally affect interstate commerce, is not in
fact a concurrent jurisdiction as to interstate commerce. Laws passed
in pursuance of this jurisdiction derive their authority solely from the
powers constitutionally reserved to the States, and the moment they
relate68directly to interstate comnmerce they become unconstitutional and
void."
This quotation is in point since the Anti-Racketeering Act was enacted
as a regulation of commerce. A state act, it should be noted, need not itself
be a regulation of commerce in order to be void when it clashes with the
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. 69 Nor does the state
6
See,
60

for example, the Larceny Act, sections quoted in note 25 supra.
The License Cases, 5 How. 504 (U. S.1847). See particularly the opinion of Mr.
Chief Justice Taney, pp. 572, 583.
671d. at 585, 591 (opinion of Mr. Justice McLean).
681 WILLOUGHBY ON THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1929) 115, § 69, (Italics added.)
69 Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, 23 L. ed. 547 (1878). A Louisiana statute required
common carriers of passengers to render equal accommodations to both white and colored persons. The owner of any vessel aboard which race discrimination was practiced
was made subject to an action for damages. In holding the statute unconstitutional, the
Court said at p. 490, 549:
"The statute under which this suit was brought, as construed by the State Court, seeks
to take away from him [owner of the vessel] that power [to adopt rules for the disposition of passengers on his boat] so long as he is within Louisiana; and while recognizing to the fullest extent the principle which sustains a statute, . . . we think this statute to the extent that it requires those engaged in the transportation of passengers
among the States to carry colored passengers in Louisiana in the same cabin with whites,
is unconstitutional and void. If the public good requires such legislation, it 'must come
from Congress and not from the States." (Italics added.)
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law have to clashwith an actual regulation of Congress. It is sufficient that
Congress shall have legislated on the subject.70 When Congress has so legislated is the problem involved in most cases. It is not necessary for Congress
to have legislated on the particular point. Congress had certainly not legislated on the particular point involved in Hall v. DeCuir.7' Nor must Congress have legislated on the particular subject so as to regulate it. It is
sufficient if Congress has legislated on the subject in some way. In such a case,
it is presumed that Congress having legislated on some phases of the subject, but not on the particular point, intended that the particular point should
remain free front regulation.72
An examination of all the pertinent decisions leads to the inevitable conclusion that whenever Congress steps into any field in pursuance of its
power to regulate interstate commerce, the states are, by that very action,
ousted from, and become incompetent to legislate in, that field with relation
to any subject whatsoever. The fact that state action does not "interfere"
with the congressional legislation but may actually aid it, makes no difference
whatever. As stated by Mr. justice Story in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the action
of Congress is considered the measure of the needed action in that field, and
73
states may therefore neither detract front nor augment the sanw.

Two very recent cases of the Supreme Court are of particular interest.
In Hines v. Davidowit, 74 the Supreme Court declared inoperative a state
70
N. Y. Central R. R. v. Hudson County, 227 U. S. 248, 33 Sup. Ct." 269 (1913).
The passage of the Interstate Commerce Act deprived a New Jersey municipality of
its power to regulate rates of a Hudson River ferry belonging to an interstate railroad
though the subject of the ferriage was not regulated by the Act or by the Interstate
Commerce
Commission.
71
See note 69 supra.
72
N. Y. Central R. R. v. Hudson County, 227 U. S. 248, 264, 33 Sup. Ct. 269, 272-273
(1913), where the" Court said:
"But as all business of the ferries between the two states was interstate commerce
within the power of Congress to control, and subject in any event to regulation by the
state as long only as no action was taken by Congress, the result of the action by Congress leaves ,the subject, that is, the interstate commerce carried on by means of the
ferries free from control by the state. We think the argument by which it is sought to.
limit the operation of the interstate commerce embraced in the business of ferriage from.
state to state is wanting in merit.

"it the absence of an express exclusion of some of the elements of interstate commerce
entering into the ferriage, the assertion of power on the part of Congress must be
treated as being cotermiows with the authority over the subject as to which the purpose of Cogress to take control was manifested. . . . The conception of the operation

at one and the same time of both the power of Congress and the power of the states

over a matter of interstate commerce is inconceivable, since the exertion of the greater
power necessarily takes possession of the field, and leaves nothing upon which the lesser

power may operate. To concede that the right of a state to regulate interstate ferriage
exists 'only in the absence of Federal legislation,' and at the same time to assert that
the state and Federal power over such subject is concurrent is a contradiction in terms.(Italics
added.)
73
See note 36 supra.
74312 U. S. 52, 61 Sup. Ct. 399 (1941).

1943]

9 ANTI-RACKETEERING ACT

alien registration law, 75 for alleged conflict with the federal act76 on the
same subject passed after the enactment of the state act, even though there
was no actual conflict between the two acts in a practical sense, since both
could operate without interfering with the other. In Cloverleaf Butter Co.
v. Patterson,77 an Alabama act,73 passed for the avowed purpose of protecting the health of its citizens, and which undoubtedly had that effect, was
invalidated for alleged conflict with a federal law on the subject. Concededly,
the federal act7" did not cover the particular point covered by the state act.
Both acts were clearly intended to protect the health of the community-the
federal act was passed ostensibly as a regulation of commerce-and both,
when viewed in that light, clearly supplemented each other.
VII.

APPARENT INTENTION OF CONGRESS

An examination of the history of federal criminal legislation prior to the
adoption of the Anti-Racketeering Act, and the circumstances under which
that Act was adopted, leads to the conclusion that Congress, in passing that
Act, assumed that it would only operate within the sphere of exclusive
federal jurisdiction.
The Anti-Racketeering Act, unlike prior enactments involving concurrent
jurisdiction, which provided that a conviction or acquittal in a state court
should preclude a subsequent trial in the federal courts, 0 has no provision
against double jeopardy. This clearly indicates that Congress believed that
it was dealing with a subject over which the Federal Government had
exclusive jurisdiction, and that no problem of double jeopardy would arise.
Nor is that all. In the only two cases in which Congress had previously
legislated with respect to crime in interstate commerce, it not only provided
against double jeopardy, but took care not to oust the states of their juris75
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1940) tit. 35, §§ 1801-1806.
7654 STAT. 673 (1940), 8 U. S. C. A. §§ 451-460.
77

Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U. S. 148, 62 Sup. Ct. 491 (1942).
THE CODE OF ALAAiAMA (1940) tit. 2, c. 1.
7953 STAT. 252 (1939), 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 2023-2027.
0
8 The legislation under the Prohibition Amendment furnishes the only exception. It
is clear, however, that notwithstanding the fact that the Amendment itself gave the
states "concurrent power" with respect to its enforcement, congressional leaders were
confident that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution placed the matter entirely
within the sphere of the Federal Government whenever the Federal Government chose to
step in. The states were to have iw power in the domain of prohibition enforcement lest
they defeat the purpose of the Amendment by methods similar to those exemplified in
the Pennsylvania statute with respect to slave-rendition. To allow the state to legislate
within the ambit of federal regulation would result in state legislation ostensibly to
enforce prohibition. Under such pretext, the state by assuming jurisdiction would oust
the federal government from dealing more severely with violators than the state would
be inclined to do.
78
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diction by stepping into the field. To avoid the settled principle that whenever the Federal Government stepped in, the states stepped out, Congress
took care, in both the Larceny Act of 1913 and the Embezzlement Act of
1914, to provide specifically for the continuance of state jurisdiction:
"Nothing in this act contained shall be held to take away or impair
the 8jurisdiction
of the courts of the several states under the laws there1
of."
No such provision is contained in the present Act. The omission emphatically suggests that Congress intended to deal with a subject over which
it had exclusive jurisdiction, i.e., with cases in which interstate commerce
was used as a means of accomplishing the crime or in effectuating its purpose.
Further proof of the intention of Congress to limit the legislation to the
sphere indicated is furnished by the circumstances under,which the AntiRacketeering Act was adopted. This Act was not an isolated piece of legislation, but was part of a "Legislative Program," prepared by a special subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce appointed to investigate
the existence of, and to recommend legislation to prevent, "crime and racketeering."8' 2 All but two of the thirteen bills constituting the "Program"
dealt with matters clearly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal
Government, the most important of them with cases in which interstate
commerce was used as a means of either accomplishing the crime or disposing of its proceeds.8 3 Of the two which were not by their language clearly
confined to matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government, one was the Anti-Racketeering Act; the other was an amplifying
amendment to the war-time sabotage law designed to convert it into a peacetime sabotage act.8 4 Of the entire "Legislative Program," most significantly,
81
This provision common to both the Larceny Act and the Embezzlement Act may be
found in 37 STAT. 670, c. 50, § 2 (1913) and 38 STAT. 733 (1914), now 18 U. S. C. A.
§§ 410, 412. See also 54 STAT. 255 (1940), 18 U. S. C. A. § 412 a making it a federal
offense to wreck a railroad train in interstate commerce. The statute contains the
usual clause preserving state jurisdiction and guaranteeing against double jeopardy.
82S. REs. No. 196, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
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0ne of these bills dealt with extortion by means of the use of interstate telephone,
telegraph, and radio. 48 STAT. 781 (1934), as amended, 53 STAT. 743 (1939), 18 U. S.
C. A. § 408d. Another dealt with the transportation of stolen securities in interstate
commerce. 48 STAT. 794 (1934), 18 U. S. C. A. § 415. One amended the Lindbergi
Act, making it a federal offense to transport kidnaped persons in interstate commerce.
47 STAT. 326 (1932), as amended, 48 STAT. 781 (1934), 18 U. S. C. A. § 408a. Another
amended the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act so as to convert it into a National
Stolen Property Act, punishing the transportation of stolen property in interstate commerce.
48 STAT. 794 (1934), 18 U. S. C. A. §§ 413-419.
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The law in question was part of the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, 40 STAT. 217,
221 (1917), and was limited to sabotage against exports to foreign countries-being
designed with a view to the existing war situation involving the shipment of supplies
and munitions to the A.E.F. and our allies. The amendment made the provisions of
that section applicable at all times to all interstate and foreign commerce.
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only the latter failed of adoption, another indication that Congress was not
prepared to extend its legislation generally into the field of crime in interstate commerce, and thereby invade a sphere of concurrent jurisdiction with
the states. The action was undoubtedly well advised, not only because of
the constitutional difficulties, but also because any such attempt would havebrought about the unfortunate conditions which prevailed under the Prohibition Amendment, and would have practically ousted the states from the
field. The Prohibition experience demonstrated that such would have been
the result even if Congress had expressly preserved the jurisdiction of the
states; a fortiori, where Congress had not.
VIII.

PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF THE

ACT

Even if it were not clear that Congress had never intended to step beyond
the sphere of exclusive federal jurisdiction, the applicability of the Act
must be limited in the manner suggested. Otherwise the Act would, at
first, create much greater confusion in the enforcement of our criminal law
than existed under the Prohibition Amendment, and, ultimately, oust the
states entirely from that large, though vague and indefinite, field of criminal
activities usually referred to as "racketeering." The sponsors of the AntiRacketeering Act,8 5 and government counsel in the recent Teamsters' Union
case,8 6 referred to the Act as an "extortion" act. "Extortion," however, is no
more concrete than "racketeering." The Act is not only "loosely drawn,"
but its language is so broad as to embrace practically the whole commerce of
the country. For the Act is not limited to "extortion" committed in,interstate commerce, but embraces the obtaining, or the attempt to obtain, of
any money, property, or any "other valuable considerations," with or without the consent of the giver, by the "use or threat to use force, violence or
coercion, in connection with or in relation to any act in any way or in any
degree affecting trade or commerce or any article or commodity moving
or about to move in trade or commerce." 87 Congress, evidently intent on
spreading its net wide, spread it entirely too wide to make the Act workable
-at least with that spread. "Trade or commerce" as used in the Act,
means, of course, interstate or foreig, trade or commerce. For constitutional
reasons, the comprehensive language used, which, literally taken, would involve all the trade and conmerce of the coitntry, must be taken as not intended to have that effect. Some trade or commerce is left out because of its
8578 CONG. REc. pp. 11402-11403 (1934).

SOBrief for the United States, Local 807, etc., et al. v. United States, 315 U. S. 521,

62 87Sup. Ct. 642 (1942).

See note 3 supra.
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purely intrastate character. In the only case in which this question of degree
was considered, it was held that the words "in any way or in any degree"
must be disregarded, and the statute construed as if those words were
equivalent to "substantially affecting."8 s "Substantially" is one of the vaguest
terms in our language; no less is the word "affecting." Every case involving
"extortion" would therefore resolve itself into the question as to how "substantially" the "act" "in connection with" or "in relation to" which the
money was obtained "affected" interstate or foreign commerce. If the case
were tried in a federal court the defendant would contend that the "affecting" was not "substantial"; in a state court, his contention would be the
opposite. On appeal not only would the evidence with respect to all of these
matters be involved, but also the instructions to the jury with respect thereto.
The prospect is most appalling.
Adding to the difficulties is the settled principle that when a person convicted in a state court claims that court to have been without jurisdiction,
he is entitled to test the question on habeas corpus.8 9 With the two jurisdictions so vaguely defined, every person convicted of any crime falling
within the broad definitions of this Act in a state court would apparently
have a right to test the question of the jurisdiction of that court in the
federal courts by means of a writ of habeas corpus. In addition to the usual
state appeals, there would be habeas corpts proceedings and appeals in the
federal courts. Under these circumstances, state attorneys would do well
to avoid prosecutions for racketeering, thereby leaving this entire field of
criminal law to federal supervision. In a way, that would be a more logical
situation than that which exists at present, when no real "racketeer" has ever
been prosecuted under the Anti-Racketeering Act.
Such a revolutionary change in the enforcement of our criminal law is
neither desirable nor necessary. Such a change was never intended by
Congress. The particular class of criminals for whose suppression this
legislation was intended was never "affected" by it, "substantially" or otherwise. It is also clear from the "course of prosecution" that the only criminals
ever touched by the Act could have been easily and satisfactorily dealt with
under state laws.
All indications, therefore, point to One solution: A construction of the
Act which would limit its operation to crimes in which interstate or foreign
commerce was used in the perpetration of the offense or in achieving its
88
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purpose. This construction would conform to the intention of Congress and
be in harmony with the "Legislative Program" of which it was a part.
Perhaps it should be noted, in conclusion, that on a certain celebrated
occasion-in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment-the Supreme Court
ruled that even so solemn an act as a constitutional amendment may be held
not to provide for all that its language purports to say, if a literal reading
of its language would effect a revolution not contemplated by the Congress
and the people in adopting it.90
0

OSlaughter House Case, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1873) ; Boudin, Truth and Fiction about
the Fourteenth Amendment (1938) 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 19.
The Anti-Racketeering Act was passed in the Senate without debate and without
division. In the House, there was a "debate" limited to less than a column of the
Congressional Record, and consisting of one member's demanding and receiving theassurance that the "labor exemption" was satisfactory to organized labor. 78 CONG.
REc. 11402-11403 (1939).

